报告题目：Detection of Malicious Attacks in Autonomous Cyber-Physical Inverter-Based Microgrids
报告人：Prof. Charalambos Konstantinou
会议时间：3月7日 (周二) 14:00
Charalambos Konstantinou is an Assistant Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) and Computer Science (CS) at the Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Science and Engineering (CEMSE) Division of King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), Thuwal, Saudi Arabia. He is the Principal Investigator of the SENTRY Lab (Secure Next Generation Resilient Systems - sentry.kaust.edu.sa) and a member of the Resilient Computing and Cybersecurity Center (RC3) at KAUST. Before joining KAUST, he was an Assistant Professor with the Center for Advanced Power Systems (CAPS) at Florida State University (FSU). His research interests are in secure, trustworthy, and resilient cyber-physical and embedded IoT systems.
He is also interested in critical infrastructures security and resilience with special focus on smart grid technologies, renewable energy integration, and real-time simulation. He received a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from New York University (NYU), NY, in 2018, and a M.Eng. Degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece,in 2012
Power systems are facing unprecedented changes in operation and control as more diverse sources and loads are being connected to these complex cyber-physical energy systems. In addition due to the growing number of Internet-of-Things (loT) connected controllers and the use of communication and control interfaces, it is a major priority for power grids to be resilient to high-impact, low-probability cyber-physical adverse events, such as cyber-attacks. Such incidents, if left unabated, can intensify and elicit system dynamics instabilities, eventually causing outages and system failures. In this talk, we will give an overview of the research of the Secure Next Generation Resilient Systems (SENTRY) lab (sentry.kaust.edu.sa) at KAUST, presenting how load-altering attacks can compromise. via loT-connected high-wattage loads. the stability of low-inertia power systems. We will also demonstrate an integrated approach for multi-agent distribution systems able to perform the detection of such malicious cyber-physical attacks based on subspace methods.